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I.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The initiative currently designated as 1487 is a measure that would change California law by
disallowing the use of automatic payroll-deducted funds for political purposes by unions,
corporations, and government contractors. 1 Measure 1487 is qualified for the November 2012
ballot. If passed, this measure would make California political contribution laws stricter than
federal law in the area of payroll deductions. 2 As California law stands right now, unions and
corporations are free to automatically deduct money from employees’ paychecks and use those
funds for political contributions. Federal law allows for this same use of paycheck deductions
for political purposes. 3
This initiative would also prohibit unions and corporations from making direct or indirect
contributions to candidates and candidate-controlled committees, while political expenditures
derived from resources other than automatic payroll deductions would remain unrestricted. 4
Corporate profits being used towards direct or indirect political contributions, for example,
would remain unrestricted. 5 Under Measure 1487, government contractors would be able to
make contributions to elected officers or officer-controlled committees, but only if the elected
official who benefited from that contribution did not attempt to use his or her official position to
influence the granting or awarding of a government contract. 6 However, this guard against
corruption in regards to beneficiaries of government contracts is already a part of state law. 7
Currently, California law prohibits agents and independent contractors from contributing more
than $500 on behalf of or for the benefit of any candidate or committee unless the candidate or
committee reports the expenditure as if they had made it themselves. 8 This prohibition includes,
but is not limited to, contributions made to an advertising agency. 9
A “yes” vote on Measure 1487 would make the restriction on the use of payroll-deducted funds
for political purposes apply to unions, corporations and government contractors alike. 10
Employees would still be permitted to make voluntary contributions to their employer or
employer’s committees if written authorization was given every year. 11 The change to existing
law would provide that if the union employees did not consent annually to these deductions, the
deductions could not be taken automatically. Corporations and government contractors would be
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of the Attorney General, California (April 1, 2011) (on file with McGeorge California Initiative Review).
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Proposed Statewide Ballot Measure from Ashlee Titus to Krystal M. Paris, supra note 1.
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Great West Contractors Inc. v. Irvine Unified School District, 187 Cal.App.4th 1425 (2010), citing Schram
Construction, Inc. v. Regents of the University of California, 187 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1053-1054 (2010), and
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CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84303 (West 2001).
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Id.
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Proposed Statewide Ballot Measure from Ashlee Titus to Krystal M. Paris, supra note 1.
11
Proposed Statewide Ballot Measure from Ashlee Titus to Krystal M. Paris, supra note 1.

subject to the same limitation, although these types of organizations do not tend to collect money
from employees through the use of payroll deductions. 12
If Measure 1487 does not pass, unions will be able to continue the practice of using automatic
payroll deductions in order to make political contributions. Corporations and government
contractors will also be free to use automatic payroll deductions for political contributions.
II.

THE LAW
a. Existing Law
i. Definitions

California law defines a contribution as a payment, a forgiveness of a loan, a payment of a loan
by a third party, or an enforceable promise to make a payment. 13 Specifically, that payment is
made for purposes related to a political nominee’s candidacy for elective office if all or a portion
of the payment is used for election-related activities. 14
ii. Campaign Contributions Under California Law
State laws place certain restrictions on the amount of money individuals, corporations, labor
unions, and other organizations may contribute to a candidate’s campaign for political office or
to a candidate-controlled committee.
The California Fair Political Practices Commission (“FPPC”) administers the state’s campaign
financing laws, imposes fines for violations of these laws, and defends these laws in court. The
FPPC sets forth all of their regulations in the California Code of Regulations (“CCR”).
Specifically, contribution amounts by individuals are limited to $3,900 to candidates for the state
legislature, $6,500 to candidates for state executive office other than the governor, and $26,000
to the candidates for governor. 15 The FPPC also regulates contributions given to state committees
that contribute to state candidates. Individuals may donate $6,500 to non-political party
committees, $32,500 to political parties, and $200 to small contributor committees. 16

iii. Campaign Contributions Under Federal Law
Organizations and individuals have a constitutional right to contribute money to political
campaigns, which is a right protected under freedom of speech. 17 Contribution limits for federal
elections are enforced by the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”). The FEC set forth all its

FAQ, CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, NORTHRIDGE (Sept. 7, 2011),
http://www.csueu.org/Home/Article/tabid/936/ItemId/723/View/Details/AMID/1977/Default.aspx
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CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82015(a) (West 2010).
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CAL. GOV’T CODE § 82015(2)(C) (West 2010).
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2 C.C.R. § 18545 (2012).
16
2 C.C.R. § 18534 (2012).
17
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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regulations in Title 11 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Individual contributions are limited
to $2,500 per candidate per federal election. 18
The FEC also regulates the amount individuals may give to committees that financially
contribute to candidates. Individuals are limited to: $30,800 to national party committees per
year; $10,000 combined to state, local, and district party committees per year; and $5,000 to any
other political committee per year. 19 In total, no individual may give more than $46,200 to
candidates and $70,800 to committees and PACs every two years. 20 This represents a $117,000
overall biennial limit. 21 The biennial limit runs for a two-year period beginning January 1 of the
odd-numbered year to December 31 of the next even-numbered year. 22
iv. Use of Union Dues
California has the largest number of union members in the country at 2.4 million people. 23 In
2011, 17.1% of all employed California residents were members of a union. 24 Union dues are
usually paid through the payroll deduction system, and these dues are typically used for
collective bargaining activities. 25 A portion of union members’ dues may be used to contribute to
candidates and candidate-controlled committees as identified by union leaders. 26
Public employee unions are free to set their own requirements of membership, including
membership dues and fees. 27 In the absence of an opt-out provision, members are required to
pay the full amount of their dues and can only object to the use of union funds by resigning his or
her union membership. 28 After resigning membership in the union, the “agency fee objector”
can officially object to the use of his or her dues for political purposes. 29 According to the
United States Department of Labor, employees who object to paying for non-representational
activities such as political expenditures may be entitled to a refund as well as an appropriate
reduction of future payments. 30
Private sector unions are governed by the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). Private
sector unions are allowed to collect membership dues through payroll deduction, provided that
they receive written authorization from the employee. 31 Thus, private sector unions can collect
membership dues either automatically through payroll deduction, or through regular payment.
18
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BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNION MEMBERS SUMMARY (Jan. 27, 2012) .
24
Id.
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Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights after Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2012).
26
11 C.F.R. § 114.5 (2012).
27
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 1152 (West 1982).
28
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, The Use of Union Dues for Political Purposes: A Discussion of Agency Fee Objectors
and Public Policy, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH POLICY ARCHIVE, (June 1998)
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/413.
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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, supra note 28.
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Office of Labor-Management Standards, Fact Sheet: Executive Order 13201 – The Notice of Employee Rights
Concerning Payment of Union Dues, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (June 15, 2005),
http://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/compliance/Beck_Fact_Sheet.htm.
31
29 U.S.C.A. § 186(C)(4) (West 1995).
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v. Non-Union Members
Non-union members pay union dues as a result of the “free-rider” problem, and payment of these
dues is often a condition of employment. 32 The “free-rider” problem refers to the concern that
because non-union members will benefit from union negotiations, negotiations on behalf of all
employees, those non-member need to pay union dues. 33 Due to the free-rider problem,
Congress has authorized compulsory unionism to the extent of funding collective bargaining, but
not as a means to force employees to support political causes. 34
The rights of public employee non-members are governed by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson. 35 While non-members must still pay required fees, they
have the right to control how their fees are used. Specifically, non-members are allowed to
object to fees that are used for any purpose unrelated to collective bargaining. 36
Hudson set forth procedural requirements that a public-employee union must provide before a
non-member’s fees can be used for a non-collective bargaining purpose. First, there must be an
adequate explanation of the basis for the fee. 37 Second, non-members must be given a
reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before a neutral decisionmaker. 38 Third, the disputed fees must be placed in an escrow account while the challenge is
pending. 39 In addition to the Hudson requirements, California requires that public employee
unions annually keep an adequate itemized record of its financial transactions. 40
A similar standard is imposed on private sector unions. The Supreme Court has established that
non-members are not required to pay fees that are unrelated to collective bargaining activities. 41
The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) currently requires a somewhat different
procedural framework from Hudson that a public-employee union must provide before a nonmember’s fees can be used for a non-collective bargaining purpose. First, a union employee
must show that he or she has the right to be a non-member. 42 Second, as a non-member, the
person must show that he or she has the right to object to payments not germane to collective
bargaining activities. 43 Third, the union must provide enough information for the employee to
make an intelligent and informed decision. 44 Fourth, the union must inform the employee of its

32

Sachs, supra note 25.
Id.
34
Id.
35
Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986) (holding that non-members
have a constitutional right to object to a compulsory funding of a union’s ideological activity).
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
40
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3546.5 (West 1977).
41
Commc’n Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) (holding that requiring non-members to pay fees as a
condition of employment does not include the right to charge fees that are not reasonably germane to collective
bargaining activities).
42
How do I cut off the use of my dues for politics and other nonbargaining activities?, NATIONAL RIGHT TO WORK
LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC. (Feb. 12, 2012), http://www.nrtw.org/a/a_4_p.htm.
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Id.
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Id.
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procedure for filing objections. 45 Fifth, the union must provide the percentage of the reduction
and the basis for the calculation, with the opportunity to challenge their calculations. 46
vi. Corporation Payroll Deductions
It is unlawful for an employer to collect wages that are to be paid to an employee. 47 Employers
are allowed, however, to make deductions in certain circumstances. First, an employer is
required to deduct when empowered by state or federal law, such as for income tax or wage
garnishments for court judgments. 48 Second, an employer is allowed to make deductions when
expressly authorized by the employee in writing, in order to cover insurance premiums, health
benefits, or other deductions that do not amount to a rebate or deduction of the standard wage. 49
Third, employers are allowed to deduct in order to cover health, welfare, or pension plans that
are expressly authorized by collective bargaining agreements. 50 Thus, in order to deduct wages
for political purposes, an employer would have to receive express written consent from its
employee.

b. Proposed Changes to the Law
i. In General
The proposed changes to the law would still permit voluntary contributions to a union’s PAC, but
only if the union employee provides annual written consent to the union and the funds are not
taken by automatic payroll deduction. 51
ii. Contributions
Currently, corporations and unions are treated as individuals for purposes of political
contribution limits. Measure 1487 would create a new prohibition on corporations and unions by
disallowing them from making any contributions to candidates or candidate-controlled
committees. 52 The proposed language of Measure 1487 states that all terms used in the
proposal’s language that are defined by the Political Reform Act of 1974 or by regulation enacted
by the Fair Political Practices Commission have the same meanings. 53 “Contribution” is defined
in the California Government Code § 84308(a)(6), an outgrowth of the Political Reform Act, as
including “contributions to candidates and committees in federal, state, or local elections.” 54
Due to the inclusive language of Measure 1487, the prohibition would extend to political
contributions made to both state and federal candidates. 55 In addition, government contractors
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Id.
Id.
47
West's Ann. CAL. LABOR CODE § 224 (West 2012).
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Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Rep. SEIU California State Council, supra note 12.
52
Proposed Statewide Ballot Measure from Ashlee Titus to Krystal M. Paris, supra note 1.
53
Id.
54
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84308 (West 2012).
55
Proposed Statewide Ballot Measure from Ashlee Titus to Krystal M. Paris, supra note 1.
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would be prohibited from making candidate contributions if that candidate, when elected, could
play a role in awarding them a government contract. 56
iii. Payroll Deductions
Unions are allowed to make payroll deductions from members for political purposes, while nonmembers have a federal right to object to political purpose deductions. Measure 1487 would
prohibit unions from making any payroll deductions that would go towards political purposes. 57
Instead, such deductions would be made strictly on a voluntary basis and unions would need to
acquire yearly written consent. 58
Conversely, Measure 1487 would have little effect on corporate payroll deductions. Currently,
corporations already need express written consent from employees if they wish to make payroll
deductions that are not authorized by state or federal law, or collective bargaining agreements. 59
Measure 1487 would create an additional requirement that written consent from corporate
employees to be given on an annual basis for payroll deductions. 60
iv. Change of the burden of proof
The statutory language of Measure 1487 states, “this measure shall be liberally construed to
further its purposes. In any legal action brought by an employee or union member to enforce the
provisions of this Act, the burden shall be on the employer or labor union to prove compliance
with the provisions herein.” 61
III.

HISTORY
a. Proposition 226 (1998)

Proposition 226 was an initiative on the June 1998 ballot. If passed, Proposition 226 would have
established new requirements with regards to payroll deductions for political activities. The
language of Proposition 226 was very much in line with that of Measure 1487. If passed, it
would have required all employers and labor organizations to annually obtain an employee’s or
member’s permission before withholding wages or using union dues or fees for political
contributions. 62
In addition, Proposition 226 would have established a provision similar to federal law prohibiting
campaign contributions from a foreign national for a candidate for public office. 63 This
restriction would have provided that residents, governments or entities of foreign countries could
not contribute to political candidates for state or local office. 64
56
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Proposed Statewide Ballot Measure from Ashlee Titus to Krystal M. Paris, supra note 1.
61
Id.
62
Proposition 226: Political Contributions by Employees, Union Members, Foreign Entities, SMART VOTER,
LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS (June 17, 1998), http://www.smartvoter.org/1998jun/ca/state/prop/226.
63
Political Contributions by Employees, Union Members, Foreign Entities. Initiative Statute, LEGISLATIVE
ANALYST’S OFFICE (June 1998), http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/1998/226_06_1998.htm.
64
Proposition 226: Political Contributions by Employees, supra note 62.
57

Proposition 226 was defeated in the June 1998 primary with 46.5% of voting Californians in
support of the initiative and 53.5% of voting Californians against it. 65
b. Proposition 75 (2005)
Proposition 75 was a measure put forth on the November 2005 ballot. If passed, Proposition 75
would have prohibited the use by public employee labor organizations of dues or fees for
political contributions without with the prior consent of individual public employees each year
on a specified written form. 66 This version of the measure also would have required unions to
keep track of member political contributions and, if requested, report this information to the
FPPC. 67
The restriction would not have applied to dues or fees collected for charitable organizations,
health care insurance, or other purposes directly benefiting the public employee. 68
Proposition 75 was defeated on the November 2005 ballot with 46.5% of voting Californians in
support of the initiative and 53.5% of voting Californians against it. 69
In 2005, opponents of Proposition 75 outspent proponents 10-to-1, “with the California Teachers
Association alone kicking in $12 million, and the California State Council of Service Employees
adding $10 million. The biggest contributor in support of the 2005 initiative was the California
Republican Party, which spent $1.2 million, followed by the California Chamber of Commerce,
which added $500,000.” 70
IV.

LIKELY EFFECTS OF PROPOSED CHANGES
a. Fiscal effect

The Legislative Analysts Office (“LAO”) estimates that if Measure 1487 were implemented, it
would likely increase the workload and costs of the FPPC. 71 The FPPC would have to increase
its budget in order to enforce and implement the new campaign finance requirements. 72 While
the LAO cannot predict an exact figure, it estimates that the cost could be in the hundreds of
thousands of dollars. 73 The LAO does note, however, that some costs could be offset by
additional revenue that the FPPC would receive for fines due to noncompliance with the new
requirements. 74
65

Id.
, Ira G. Clary & Nathan Barankin. Proposition 75: Public Employee Union Dues. Restrictions on Political
Contributions., CAL. INIT. REV., (Fall 2005).
67
Proposition 75: Public Employee Union Dues. Restrictions on Political Contributions. Employee Consent
Requirement, SMART VOTER, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS (Jan. 28, 2006),
http://www.smartvoter.org/2005/11/08/ca/state/prop/75/.
68
Clary & Barankin, supra note 66.
69
Proposition 75: Public Employee Union Dues, supra note 67.
70
Steve Malanga, New bid to limit union political donations in California, PUBLIC SECTOR, INC. (June 9, 2011),
http://www.publicsectorinc.com/forum/2011/06/new-bid-to-limit-union-political-donations-in-california.html.
71
Stop Special Interest Money Now Act, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE (Jan. 28, 2012),
http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2011/110309.aspx.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
66

V.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
a. Preemption

Preemption is a doctrine derived from the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.75
Under the doctrine of preemption, federal law preempts state law when the two are in conflict.
Preemption can be either express or implied. Express preemption occurs when a federal statute
directly confirms the intent of Congress to preempt state law. 76 Implied preemption can occur in
two ways, conflict or field preemption. 77 Conflict preemption applies if the state and federal
statute are in direct conflict with one another, and thus it is impossible to follow both laws
without violating one of them. 78 Field preemption is warranted if a court finds that the federal
government “occupies the field” in the relevant area of law, and thus did not intend for the states
to supplement it. 79
The decision in Buckley v. Valeo “is authority for state limits on campaign contributions.” 80
According to this United States Supreme Court decision, states can enact statutes that create
different contributions limits than provided for by federal campaign laws. Specifically, Buckley
held that comparable state limits on contributions to state political candidates are constitutional,
“and those limits need not be pegged to the precise dollar amounts approved in Buckley.” 81
Thus, the Court’s decision in Buckley is direct authority for states’ abilities to make laws
regarding campaign contribution limits.
In Davenport v. Washington Education Association, the U.S. Supreme Court repeatedly
emphasized that “states have broad discretion to tailor the benefit of allowing the union to take
money from the paychecks of workers to support union activities so long as they do so in a
manner that is above the “constitutional floor” established by cases like Beck, Hudson, and
Abood.” 82 In Davenport, the United States Supreme Court expressly gave states the latitude to
make laws concerning union paycheck deductions. 83 Because of this express decision, states are
free to enact paycheck deduction statutes as long as they do not contradict federal law regarding
permissive amounts of payroll deductions. 84
b. Freedom of Speech

75

U.S. CONST. art. VI. (The "Constitution and the laws of the United States...shall be the supreme law of the
land...anything in the constitutions or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding").
76
English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990).
77
Massachusetts Ass'n of HMOs v. Ruthardt, 194 F.3d 176, 179 (1st Cir. 1999).
78
Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
79
Id.
80
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
81
Id.
82
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Knox v. SEIU, 2011 WL 4352228 (U.S.) (Appellate Brief) Supreme Court of the United States.
83
84

Davenport v. Washington Education Association, 127 U.S. 2372 (2007).
Id.

The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law…abridging freedom of speech.” 85
First, it is significant that both corporations and unions could bring First Amendment claims due
to the decision in Citizens United. The First Amendment has been interpreted to have been
written in terms of speech, not speakers, so there is no basis for excluding certain categories of
speakers. 86
The First Amendment claim could be related to the ban on candidate contributions. Limits on
contributions to candidate campaigns have yet to be held unconstitutional. 87
Bans on contributions to candidate campaigns, however, are another matter. The California
Supreme Court has previously held that a ban on lobbyist contributions to candidates was
unconstitutional. 88 While the Court’s decision dealt with the rights of lobbyists, that right could
be extended to corporations and unions as a result of Citizens United. An interest in anticorruption is valid, but limitations on contributions already further that interest. 89 Individuals
have the freedom to symbolically associate with candidates through political contributions, and
that right could logically include corporations and unions. 90
State regulations imposing limits on the amount of money that PACs may contribute are subject
to strict scrutiny. This requires such regulations to be narrowly tailored to serve a sufficiently
compelling state interest.
Political contributions are a form of political free speech, as they represent a contributor’s ability
to freely associate with a political candidate or party. An express ban on political contributions
would be a direct suppression of this political speech. Measure 1487 may represent an anticorruption interest, but that interest is mitigated by campaign contribution limits already in place.
Campaign contribution limits already ensure that political candidates do not receive large
donations from a relatively small number of donors. Moreover, the Buckley court noted,
“contribution restrictions could have a severe impact on political dialogue if the limitations
prevented candidates and political committees from amassing the resources necessary for
effective advocacy.” 91 An express ban would seriously hamper political candidates’ abilities to
raise enough funds to effectively run their campaigns. Thus, Measure 1487 could be interpreted
as too broad and not serving an important state interest that would justify its restriction on First
Amendment freedoms.
c. Severability

85
86

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010).

87

Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S.Ct. 612 (1976) (holding that a limitation on contributions involves little
direct restraint on political communication because it permits the symbolic expression of support
while not infringing on the contributor’s ability to discuss candidates and issues).
88

Fair Political Practices Comm’n v. Super. Ct., 25 Cal.3d 33, 53 (1979) (holding that a ban infringed on a
lobbyists’ freedom of association and a ban on all contributions was not narrowly directed to aspects of political
association where political corruption could be identified).
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Buckley v. Valeo, 96 S.Ct. 612 (1976).

If a court finds a part of the initiative to be invalid or unconstitutional, it will apply the three-part
Gerken test. 92 For an initiative to survive the Gerken test, the remaining parts of the measure
must: make grammatical sense; be complete and functional in and of itself; and be something the
electorate considered separately and would have adopted without the invalid provisions. 93 The
third part of the Gerken test is a consideration of whether the electorate would have voted for the
initiative if it were presented in its severed form. 94
Measure 1487 covers two main prohibitions: a prohibition on corporations, unions, and
government contractors from making direct contributions to political candidates; and a
prohibition on corporations and unions from using payroll deductions for political purposes
without voluntary written consent. While Measure 1487 is titled the “Stop Special Interest
Money Now Act,” its supporters also know it as the “Paycheck Protection Act”. The act is
recognized as both stopping the contributions to candidates, as well as giving greater control to
employees and union members over what may be deducted from their paychecks. Thus, it seems
very likely that the electorate would vote for both provisions if they were presented as separate
initiatives.
Measure 1487 burdens both unions and corporations in participating in political campaigns. If
1487 passes, it is likely to be challenged on First Amendment grounds as a violation of free
speech.
In Citizens United, the non-profit corporation Citizens United brought an action against the
Federal Elections Commission regarding whether it was allowed to air a documentary critical of
then-presidential candidate Hilary Clinton. 95 Citizens United brought the suit because it was
afraid it would be violating 2 U.S.C. § 441b, which prohibited corporations and unions from
using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech that expressly
advocated the election or defeat of a candidate. 96
The Supreme Court held that 2 U.S.C. § 441b was unconstitutional. 97 The Court evaluated the
law under strict scrutiny, which requires the Government to prove that the restriction it created
furthers a compelling interest, and that the restriction is narrowly tailored to achieve that
interest. 98 The Court reasoned that laws enacted to regulate or control speech can operate at
different points in the speech process. 99 Thus, a restriction on the amount of money a person or
group can spend on political communications about a campaign reduces the quality of expression
because it reduces the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of
the audience reached. 100 The corporate expenditures at issue in the case did not interfere with
any government functions, but did interfere with voters’ ability to obtain information from
diverse sources in order to determine how to cast their votes. 101 Therefore, 2 U.S.C. § 441b
violated the First Amendment.
92
93

Gerken v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 6 Cal.4th 707 (1993).

Id.
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Id.
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Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010).
100
Id.
101
Id.

Concurrently, the Supreme Court recognized that First Amendment rights extend to corporations
and unions. Specifically, corporations could be considered individuals because political speech
did not lose protection simply because its source was a corporation. 102 Like individuals,
corporations fund their speech from money obtained through the economic market. 103 Moreover,
there is no real difference between regular corporations and media corporations, so restrictions
similar to 2 U.S.C. § 441b would allow the government to suppress political speech through
media outlets. 104
It is important to note, however, that the Supreme Court’s opinion dealt primarily with
electioneering communications. It did not deal with direct candidate contributions limits, which
have been held as a constitutional means to prevent quid pro quo corruption. 105
Measure 1487’s second section seems to be a more explicit violation of the Citizens United
decision. An express ban on using payroll deductions for political purposes violates a
corporation’s right to make independent expenditures, as political speech cannot be suppressed
on the basis of corporate identity. 106 In addition, unions fund their general treasury funds with
payroll deductions. A ban on the use of their funds is a violation of First Amendment political
speech rights. Moreover, the Supreme Court has found that there is no overriding anti-corruption
interest in regulating independent expenditures because there is a difference between speaking on
issues of general public interest and incurring political debts from legislators. 107 By banning
payroll deductions from being used for any political purposes, Measure 1487 infringes on a
union’s right to engage in political speech.
Conversely, it could be argued that the issue is not about a corporation or union’s right to engage
in political speech, but rather the money they use to fund that political speech. Thus, proponents
of Measure 1487 could argue that corporations and unions are imposing their own political
speech on their employees and members. In regards to payroll deductions, the Supreme Court
has previously held in Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Association that an Idaho law that banned
public state employee unions from using payroll deductions for political purposes was
constitutional. 108 Ysursa was decided, however, before the Citizens United decision. Thus,
Ysursa could conflict with a union’s ability to make political expenditures in accordance with
their First Amendment right.
More importantly, Ysursa created a critical distinction between private corporations and public
employee unions. The Supreme Court declined to extend strict scrutiny to the Idaho unions
because of the relationship between government and private corporations, versus the relationship
between government and subordinate units of the government. 109 Specifically, the Court noted
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that a private corporation is subject to regulation, but a subordinate unit carries out delegated
government functions and is subject to direct oversight. 110
While both corporations and public unions are subject to the government’s authority, only
corporations have privileges and immunities that can be invoked in opposition to government
regulation. 111 As a subordinate unit, a public employee union is subject to the government’s will.
Therefore, the constitutionality of payroll deductions may differ depending on who brings a First
Amendment suit. It would seem that private corporations and private unions would have a much
stronger claim under a strict scrutiny review, while public employee unions have fewer rights
because of their subordinate relationship with the government.
One thing that Ysursa and Citizens United do not address, however, is an important fundamental
difference that exists between corporations and unions. A union’s general treasury consists of
union dues paid by members. Federal law regulates the use of union dues by prohibiting unions
from using an employee’s dues for political purposes if that employee objects. 112 Conversely,
corporations derive their general treasury funds from profits generated from shareholder
investments. 113 Unlike unions, corporations are free to use their general funds however they may
choose and shareholders cannot opt out. 114 Thus, while campaign finance law aims to treat
corporations and unions evenhandedly, it results in an unbalanced treatment. This imbalance is
created because Ysursa and Citizens United only addressed the ability to spend on political
expenditures, not the ability to fund that spending. The law does not require that unions and
corporations have access to a similar amount of funds for political expenditures. The law does,
however, give corporations a legal advantage over unions because corporations can spend their
general treasuries on politics even if individual shareholders object, while unions cannot do so.
In a corporate setting, individual shareholders cannot opt out of financing political spending,
while union members remain free to opt out. 115
In addition, the Supreme Court is currently deciding a case that implicates a union’s ability to
make payroll deductions for political purposes from non-consenting non-members. In Knox v.
SEIU, the Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”) made a special assessment in 2005
in order to combat Proposition 75, which was aimed at restricting the use of union funds for
political purposes. 116 While SEIU sent out the required legal notice to non-members explaining
how the fees were calculated and would be used, it did not comport with legal notice
requirements. 117 Non-union employees successfully brought a claim in District Court that their
First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. 118 The Ninth Circuit reversed in
part, however, and the non-union employees subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court, where
the outcome is still pending. 119
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An argument can be made that Knox is moot because the non-union employees have already
received their award from the district court and did not appeal from the district court ruling. 120
Moreover, SEIU has implemented new notice requirements that satisfied the employees’
concerns. 121 The Supreme Court could still make a decision, however, based on the merits of the
claim. Specifically, the question for the Court to decide would turn on whether state employees
have the First Amendment right to decline to pay union dues used for political advocacy for the
union. Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s decision in Knox will have a direct impact on the
eventual failure or success of Measure 1487.
VI.

DRAFTING ISSUES
a. Severability Clause

Measure 1487 contains a severability clause that allows clauses of the initiative to be removed if
they are found to be invalid. Specifically, it states that if any part is found to be invalid or
unconstitutional, then, “…the remaining provisions, parts, and applications shall remain in effect
without the invalid provision, part, or application.” 122 Although the initiative has a severability
clause, it is not determinative.
If a court finds a part of the initiative to be invalid or unconstitutional, it will apply the three-part
Gerken test (outlined above on page 13). For an initiative to survive the Gerken test, the
remaining parts of the measure must: make grammatical sense; be complete and functional in
and of itself; and be something the electorate considered separately and would have adopted
without the invalid provisions. 123
While Measure 1487 is clearly drafted, it does contain several provisions that could be held
unconstitutional. Both its prohibition of direct contributions to political candidates and its
prohibition on the use of payroll deductions could come under strict scrutiny by the Court. If
both parts of Measure 1487 were to be held unconstitutional, then the proposed initiative would
not likely survive because both provisions are the substantive part of the petition.
Measure 1487 would likely survive if only one of the provisions was held to be unconstitutional.
A prohibition on direct contributions to political candidates does not implicate a prohibition on
using payroll deductions for political purposes, and vice versa. Thus, depending on whether both
substantive provisions of the initiative are declared unconstitutional, Measure 1487 could survive
the first two parts of the Gerken test.
VII.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
a. Proponents’ Main Arguments
i. Removal of Special Interests From Politics
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Measure 1487 is a project of the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association. 124 According to the
official Measure 1487 website, the Stop Special Interest Money Now Act “removes Big Money
Interests from politics so that public officials will pay more attention to the people who elected
them.” 125 Proponents also state in a video featured on the website that special interests dominate
California, and the government is serving the “big special interests” instead of the people. 126
Dan Walters, a political journalist for the Sacramento Bee, is quoted in the official website video
as stating, “the Capitol’s chief activity is, in fact, directly or indirectly taking money from
someone and giving it to someone else. And one of its dirty little secrets is that the hundreds of
millions of dollars spent on lobbying, contributions and other tools of persuasion pale in
comparison to the many billions of dollars that politicians can dispense.” 127 Essentially, the main
argument is that with the passing of Measure 1487, government officials and politicians would
no longer be influenced by any breed of special interest money.
The website video discusses how politicians in Sacramento do not have the best interests of
California’s residents at heart. 128 Instead, proponents of Measure 1487 argue that politicians in
California are really working “for the special interests that bankroll their campaigns.” 129
Proponents state that Measure 1487 “attacks at every point where money changes hands between
special interests and California’s politicians in three ways: (1) bans both corporate and labor
union contributions to campaigns, (2) it stops government contractors from contributing to
officials who can award them contracts, stopping pay-to-play, and (3) bars all employers and
unions from taking money out of employees’ payroll checks for political purposes.” 130
Proponents argue that California is broken. Themes such as California’s high unemployment,
failing schools, high taxation, billions in unfunded state employee pension debt, and the lack of
politicians’ ability to balance the state budget are all cited as reasons why California needs
Measure 1487. 131 U.S. Secretary of State and longtime California resident George Shultz argues,
“the initiative, which would enact progressive reforms to California’s campaign finance system,
seeks to end the toxic pay-for-play politics by which corporations and unions corrupt politicians
in Sacramento and throughout California’s cities and counties.” 132 By weakening the effect of
special interest persuasion, legislators will have more time to focus on the job at hand and
accomplish something productive for California and its residents. 133 “The Stop Special Interest
Money Now Act will fundamentally dilute the corrosive nature of this system by altering the
relationship between politicians and their campaign contributors.” 134
ii. Equal Effect on Unions and Corporations
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Michael D. Capaldi, a Southern California-based attorney, asserts that Measure 1487 curtails the
actions of both unions and corporations, contrary to the claim of unions that they would be the
ones disproportionately affected in a negative manner by this measure. Capaldi claims, “We can
do both -- deal a blow to corporate and union power together. That's Stop Special Interest Money
Now. It's tough on both sides, but it's good for California.” 135
In fact, corporations are asserted to feel more of a negative consequence from the measure than
unions. Capaldi states, “when you do the math, it turns out the contribution ban hurts
corporations far more than unions… not only will unions be fine because corporations will be
no-shows, labor will dominate direct political contributions.” 136
iii. Protects Free Expression without Coercion
A central argument in support of Measure 1487 is that it would protect the right of union
members and corporate employees to express their views and contribute to campaigns as they
saw fit, if at all; and it is unquestionably unfair and coercive to force employees to contribute to
these political causes automatically. 137 Most of all, proponents say that union political
fundraising will not be affected because unions can still collect political contributions on an
automatic basis.
The only difference is that with Measure 1487, labor unions and corporations cannot freely reach
their powerful hands into an employee’s paycheck coffer in order to further union or
corporation’s own political agenda. “First, unions will be free to ask their members to
contribute. In fact, unions will be entitled to collect political contributions automatically, directly
from any member's bank account or credit card, if they receive the member's permission. Every
union will be able to raise political money, and the unions that promote causes their members
actually support will raise more.” 138 This ensures that employees are contributing to causes that
they actually believe in, and are not simply being coerced into contributing blindly to a cause
they may not agree with. After all, workers have “a constitutional right to be free from
compelled speech”, and this right should be vigorously protected. 139
iv.

Aligns State Law with Federal Law

Some proponents make the argument that the introduction and passage of Measure 1487 would
simply be aligning California state law with existing federal law by taking “the rulings the
Supreme Court made in the cases of Communication Workers v. Beck and Chicago Teachers
Union v. Hudson, and [giving] them the force of law in California.” This was said by Lew Uhler,
head of the National Tax Limitation Committee (“NTLC”), one of the driving forces behind the
almost-successful 1998 initiative. 140

135

Michael D. Capaldi, Michael D. Capaldi: Initiative Would Curb Corporate Influence as well as Unions, Special
to the Mercury News, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (24 Feb. 2012),
http://www.mercurynews.com/opinion/ci_20037613.
136
Capaldi, supra note 135.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, supra note 82.
140
John Gizzi, Paycheck Protection Makes a California Comeback, HUMAN EVENTS: POWERFUL CONSERVATIVE
VOICES (citing Communication Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), and Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson,
475 U.S. 292 (1986)).

b. Opponents’ Main Arguments
i. Payroll Deduction
Opponents argue that Measure 1487 has the practical effect of only limiting unions and is a
veiled attempt to restrict organized labor’s sources of funding. Through the payroll deduction
system, unions are able to obtain funds from their members that they might not otherwise be able
to if they were required to obtain yearly written consent. 141 Unions rely on member dues as the
primary source for general funds, and Measure 1487 handcuffs their ability to pool money in
order to make any sort of political impact akin to corporations. 142 As an example of the disparity
in spending, as of 2008 numbers, corporations outspent unions 19 to 1. 143 The Center for
Responsive Politics puts this number closer to 15 to 1, but regardless opponents point out that the
disparity is substantial. 144
Furthermore, opponents argue that corporations would have an easier time side-stepping
Measure 1487’s limitations as opposed to unions. 145 While corporations are restricted from
using payroll deductions as a means to create funds for political contributions, corporations do
not often use payroll deductions for that purpose. 146 Instead, corporations often dip into their
profits for political contribution funds. 147 Measure 1487 may limit political contributions that
stem from payroll deductions, but it does not restrict political contributions from other sources of
funds. Corporations could turn to corporate rents, investment income, organizational dues from
other corporations, and any other source of non-employee based revenues. 148 Thus, corporations
would continue to make unlimited contributions from their profits without the need for consent
from their employees.
Additionally, opponents point out that almost identical measures have been proposed twice in the
past, and have failed on both occasions. The only difference between those past initiatives and
Measure 1487 is the technical inclusion of corporations, presumably in order to appeal to a wider
audience of Californians. In fact, the informational video on the proponent’s official website is
stated as being posted by “takebackca,” but interestingly has no relation whatsoever to the
California Democratic activist group with a similar name, “Take Back Red California.” 149

ii. Government Contractor Definition
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Opponents also take issue with the government contractor provision. While the provision seems
to be applicable to both unions and corporations, opponents argue it is specifically directed at
unions because government contracts are defined as including collective bargaining agreements
between public agencies and labor unions. 150
By definition, collective bargaining agreements address the terms and conditions of services
provided to employers. Unions in the state of California include public employee unions, the
majority of which have collective bargaining agreements with administrative agencies. On the
other hand, private corporations do not often contract with public agencies. Such private-public
partnerships are rare and California has often reacted negatively to privatization, including recent
efforts to privatize state water and parks. Thus, opponents argue that the government contractors
provision is aimed almost exclusively at unions.
iii. Unaddressed PAC Problem
Opponents also point out that Measure 1487 does not address the real source of political
contributions: independently run political action committees. Political action committees, or
PACs, are independently run political committees that can represent business and labor interests,
political candidates, and even ballot initiatives. 151 While Measure 1487 bans unions and
corporations from making direct contributions to candidates, it does not ban contributions to
PACs.
Unions would still be hindered in their ability to donate to PACs because of Measure 1487’s
payroll deduction ban. If unions wanted to create political action committees, their PAC would
have to be funded by members by means other than a payroll deduction system, with yearly
written consent. 152 Effectively, unions would have to rely on voluntary contributions from their
members outside of the regular dues system.
On the other hand, corporations could continue to make contributions to PACs if those
contributions were derived from sources other than employee-based deductions. In addition,
PACs could use those funds to make direct contributions to candidates as long as donations were
made from the individuals of the corporation and not from the corporation itself. Thus, PACs
would remain a viable way for corporations to funnel money for candidate contributions.
Moreover, Measure 1487 does not address the growing super PAC problem. Super PACs are
independent expenditure-only committees that are unaffiliated with political parties and
candidates. 153 Corporations and unions are allowed to make unlimited contributions to super
PACs, who in turn spend money advocating the election or defeat of specific candidates. Thus, a
corporation could make unlimited contributions to super PACs, who in turn would independently
campaign for candidates that the corporation supports.
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In the current election cycle as of March 14, 2012, outside groups have spent $92,085, 861 on
both state and federal elections. 154 Organizations not affiliated with political parties have spent
$88,284,926 of that amount, of which $77,481,361 was spent by super PACs. 155
iv. Scope of Campaign Contributions
Opponents also point out that corporations do not devote a lot of funds contributing to political
candidates. Typically, corporations focus their political expenditures on ballot measures,
initiatives, and other independent campaigns. 156 This is significant because Measure 1487
specifically focuses upon donations to political candidates. Thus, Measure 1487 isn’t as nearly
as effective as it purports to be because it only addresses one area of political contributions,
which attracts a small percentage of corporate political expenditures.
In particular, Altria, Chevron, and AT&T have spent around $19.4 million collectively in
California politics in the last two years. 157 Of that amount, $2.7 million went to candidates or
incumbents. 158 The other $16.7 million went towards ballot measures, initiatives, and political
parties. 159
Thus, opponents point out that corporations could still find other ways to make political
contributions. Again, this goes back to the payroll deduction system. Many unions receive
membership dues through a payroll deduction system, so they would be unable to make
contributions towards ballot measures and independent campaigns. On the other hand,
corporations do not rely as heavily on employee funds for political contributions and would still
be able to fund political expenditures.
According to Thad Kousser, a political science professor at UC San Diego, unions need to devote
a substantial amount of resources towards blocking this bill, or else “they could become almost
extinct in California politics.” 160 Additionally, opponent Ron Lind, President of the United Food
and Commercial Workers Local 5, stated:
[T]he measure is a wolf in sheep's clothing designed to fool voters
into approving a corporate power grab that will lead to even more
corporate influence over our political system. What the backers
won't say publicly is that they've written a giant loophole to allow
for unlimited corporate spending on campaigns while furthering
their real agenda of silencing the voices of middle-class workers
and their unions. 161
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Measure 1487 represents the public’s growing mistrust of special interest influence on
government. If passed, Measure 1487 would create two new prohibitions on corporations and
unions. First, corporations and unions would no longer be permitted to make direct political
contributions to candidates for office or to candidate-controlled committees. Second,
corporations and unions would no longer be able to use payroll deductions as a source of funding
for political purposes.
Proponents argue that limiting the sphere of influence that special interests have on politics is
always a good thing. Thus, there is a strong anti-corruption interest because a prohibition on
contributions limits the leverage that special interests create and politicians no longer feel the
need to reward their donors. Moreover, proponents argue that Measure 1487 helps protect the
political rights of union members and employees. Instead of handing over money to their unions
or employers, they are free to donate as they choose. As Gary Schultz notes, “it minimizes the
influence of the well-funded few and empowers the nearly-silenced many.” 162
Opponents, on the other hand, point out that Measure 1487 is not as even-handed as it seems.
Specifically, Measure 1487 attacks unions more so than it does corporations. Opponents point
out that corporations do not rely on payroll deductions for political purposes, and often donate to
political causes from their profits, investments, or other sources of independent revenue.
Moreover, unions do not have access to other funds and rely solely on membership dues for their
general treasury funds. “That's why the nonpartisan consumer advocacy group Public Citizen
recently opposed the measure, saying it ‘is little more than an attack on labor masquerading as
campaign finance reform.’” 163 The direct result of Measure 1487 would be that of “depriving
Democratic political candidates of a major source of campaign cash.” 164 Opponents argue that
since unions represent the interests of all workers, not just those of union members, it is
imperative that they continue to have a voice in politics—and this voice will be drowned out if
Measure 1487 is passed. 165
Even if Measure 1487 is approved, it implicates several First Amendment issues. Citizens
United, a Supreme Court case, gave corporations and unions the right to make independent
political expenditures because it was deemed a form of political free speech. More importantly,
the Supreme Court is currently deciding Knox v. SEIU, which could directly affect whether
unions are allowed to make payroll deductions for political purposes.
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